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Abstract
Given that biological motion is both detected and preferred early in life, we tested the hy-
pothesis that biological motion might be instrumental to infants’ differentiation of animate
and inanimate categories. Infants were primed with either point-light displays of realistic bio-
logical motion, random motion, or schematic biological motion of an unfamiliar shape. After
being habituated to these displays, 12-month-old infants categorized animals and vehicles
as well as furniture and vehicles with the sequential touching task. The findings indicated
that infants primed with point-light displays of realistic biological motion showed better cate-
gorization of animates than those exposed to random or schematic biological motion.
These results suggest that human biological motion might be one of the motion cues that
provide the building blocks for infants’ concept of animacy.
Introduction
Evidence from various lines of research supports the assertion that infants form categories in a
top-down manner, from most to least inclusive [1–5]. Infants are first able to form global or su-
perordinate-level categories (e.g., animals vs. furniture) before being able to categorize nar-
rower, less inclusive categories such as basic-level categories (e.g., cats vs. dogs; chairs vs.
tables). In a seminal paper on the development of object categories in infancy, Mandler and
Bauer [6] reported basic-level categorization in infants as young as 16 months of age using a se-
quential touching task, when the basic-level categories came from differing superordinate cate-
gories (e.g., dogs vs. cars are from the animal and vehicle category) but not when the contrasts
were from the same superordinate category (e.g., cars vs. trucks are both from the vehicle cate-
gory). Using the same sequential touching task, the authors found that 18-month-old infants
were able to differentiate superordinate-level categories (animals vs. vehicles) but not basic-
level categories of low contrast (e.g., dogs vs. horses) or moderate contrast (e.g., cars vs. motor-
cycles). By 30 months of age, infants were capable of discriminating low and moderate degrees
of contrast at the basic-level [2]. In a more recent study, Bornstein and Arterberry [1] systemat-
ically examined categorization at four different levels of inclusiveness in 12- to 30-month-old
infants. While categorization at a more inclusive level (e.g., superordinate-level ‘animals’ such
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as ducks, lions, pigs, and porpoises) was found to be above chance by 18 months of age,
12-month-old infants only showed a trend to categorize at the most inclusive level. This con-
flicts with evidence for the precocity of the animate-inanimate distinction when other tasks are
used, such as the object examination procedure [7, 8]. Both 9- and 11-month-old infants cate-
gorize superordinate-level categories of animals and vehicles, while 7-month-old infants dem-
onstrate a slightly lower level of performance. Recently, a study using event-related potentials
with an oddball paradigm showed that 7-month-olds show a stronger novelty response to
an oddball stimulus from a different superordinate level category (e.g., animal vs. furniture)
than from the same category [9]. The main goal of the current study was to determine if
12-month-old infants are able to categorize animate and inanimate objects in the sequential
touching task when provided with a priming stimulus common to animals, that is, biological
motion.
While there is mounting evidence for the precocious acquisition of the animacy concept,
much less is known about the perceptual cues infants use to acquire such an “abstract” concept.
There are two broad classes of perceptual cues that could contribute to the identification of enti-
ties as animate or inanimate: featural cues (e.g., face, wheels) and dynamic cues (e.g., self-
propulsion, movement upon contact). It has been hypothesized that infants form conceptual cat-
egories by extracting both static morphological and dynamic features of objects and use this in-
formation to determine an object’s category membership [10–12]. While it may be possible to
categorize perceptually dissimilar objects using morphology alone (e.g. differentiation of animals
and vehicles using object parts or general shape), the differentiation of perceptually similar items
(e.g., birds and airplanes) likely requires more sophisticated knowledge of dynamic attributes [7].
Mandler [10, 13, 14] has hypothesized that it is the perception of motion characteristics that pro-
vides infants with conceptual knowledge about the “kinds of things” objects are. Specifically, she
proposed that infants’ animate-inanimate conceptual categories are formed on the basis of con-
ceptual primitives, which involve the movement of objects in space. These conceptual primitives
may include whether objects start moving by themselves, whether they interact with other ob-
jects, and the kind of path they take. Similarly, Rakison and Poulin-Dubois [12] proposed that
the foundation of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy relies on the following five mo-
tion cues: a) onset of motion (self-propelled vs. caused motion), b) type of causal role (agent vs. re-
cipient), c) form of causal action (action at a distance vs. action from contact), d) pattern of
interaction (contingent vs. non-contingent), and e) line of trajectory (irregular vs. smooth).
The current research was designed to examine whethermanner of motion (biological vs.
non-biological), a basic animacy cue, facilitates animate-inanimate categorization in infancy.
Biological motion refers to the characteristic, non-rigid patterns produced when humans and
other animals move constrained by their skeletal structure. These biomechanical motion pat-
terns are informative about an agent’s identity, emotional state, and activity, and adult observ-
ers are highly attuned to these features [15]. Biological motion processing is fast and automatic
in adults and involves specialized cortical mechanisms, most notably the posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS, e.g., [16, 17]). Biological motion is typically studied by placing point-
lights on the joints of the body, which is otherwise rendered invisible in the dark [18]. Point-
light displays have been used to investigate the perception of biological motion across the life-
span. The ability to correctly recognize point-light biological motion of humans and animals is
comparable to adults by 5 years of age [19]. In infancy, visual preference for biological motion
has been demonstrated in newborns [20, 21] and 3-month-old infants [22, 23]. Further,
12-month-old infants extract social-cognitive cues, such as gaze following, from a point light
display of a human walking [24]. Although 9-month-olds have been shown to categorize
point-light displays of animals [25], the notion that biological motion perception is integral to
infants’ differentiation of animate and inanimate concepts has received no empirical attention.
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It has been suggested that the presentation of biological motion using point-light display
confounds motion and form perception. That is, although no explicit shape information is pro-
vided, the body shape is implicit in the display and could be used when processing this type of
stimulus [26]. Another stimulus that generates the perception of animacy is the schematic,
non-rigid “caterpillar” motion [27]. Schematic presentations of biological motion, such as the
Michotte “caterpillar,” depict a rectangular-shaped stimulus that moves by elongating from
one side, then contracting on the opposite side. This stimulus has been shown to elicit the per-
ception of goal-directedness in infants as young as 6 months of age [28] and is judged as
‘animal-like’ in children as young as 3 years of age [29]. Such judgments must be based on mo-
tion alone, as the rectangular shape of the stimulus is not animate in its morphology.
Given that biological motion is detected and preferred early in life, biological motion might
be instrumental to infants’ differentiation of animate and inanimate concepts. One way to test
whether this type of animate motion is a dynamic cue that infants use to facilitate the animate-
inanimate distinction is by priming infants and observing improvement in their categorization
performance. Priming involves the facilitation or activation of a concept by way of providing
other conceptually related information [30]. In previous research, priming has been successful-
ly used to increase social affiliation in very young children and to influence which level of inclu-
siveness infants focus on when categorizing objects [31, 32].
The overall objective of this study was to determine whether priming 12-month-old infants
with biological motion improves their ability to categorize animate and inanimate objects
when assessed with the sequential touching task. We investigated whether a point-light display
of a human primes categorization of animals in 12-month-old infants. Previous research has
shown that about 50% of 12-month-old infants categorize at the global level with a mean run
length just at trend level [1]. Given that the human point-light display has been shown to also
contain morphological cues [33], we view this prime as investigating the combined influence of
motion and morphology. We also presented infants with a schematic biological motion prime,
the Michotte stimulus, to provide a more stringent test of the potential effect of biological mo-
tion per se. We hypothesized that infants who were primed with human biological motion or
schematic biological motion would categorize animals and vehicles better than infants who
viewed random motion. In contrast, infants’ categorization of inanimate furniture-vehicle con-
trasts was not expected to be facilitated by these priming stimuli.
Method
Participants
A total of 106 infants were tested. Infants had no reported birth complications, as well as no
visual or auditory impairment. Seventy-nine infants were included in the final analysis
(M age = 12.36 months, SD =.42, age range: 11.69 to 13.40 months; 42 males) as the remaining
27 participants were excluded due to fussiness (n = 17), throwing toys (n = 8), and parental in-
terference (n = 2). The experimental procedures were approved by the Human Research Ethics
Committee of Concordia University, and all the parents involved were informed and consented
(in written form) to let their child participate prior to data collection. All participants were free
to withdraw from the experiment at any time.
Materials
Human Biological Motion Prime. The human point-light walker video was composed of
11 point-light dots placed on all the major joints of the body. The walker moved rightward
with no horizontal translation, 20 steps (10 gait cycles). In the creation of the human walker,
eleven marker positions were used to capture the subject’s motion at all the major joints of the
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body. These markers convey important information about both the structure of the body
(where the various joints and bones are located) and the dynamic movements of each part
(e.g., the velocity of the arm swing vs. the stability of the trunk) [33]. The final video consisted
of one 15-second trial, containing 30 complete gait cycles (0.5 seconds/cycle).
Schematic Motion Prime. The stimulus presented in this video was adapted from
Michotte’s [27] schematic, non-rigid, caterpillar motion. A blue square (1.5 cm x 1.5 cm) ex-
panded towards the right, while the left side remained still, forming the shape of a rectangle
(1.5 cm x 3.5 cm). Next, the rectangle contracted wherein the right side remained still and the
left side moved until the shape returned to its original form. The overall motion pattern of the
schematic form was a rightward horizontal translation. This expansion-contraction motion
was repeated six times for a trial duration of 15 seconds. At the beginning of each new trial, the
square reappeared on the left side of the screen and moved rightward.
RandomMotion Control Prime. The randommotion control video used the same
11 point-light dots as the human biological motion display. Each dot was given a smooth line
of trajectory and a fixed speed using VPixx© software [34]. None of the dots contained animate
cues, such as the ability to change direction, change speed, or move contingently with other
dots. The direction of the point-light dots was also controlled by having the same amount of
dots moving to the right, left, up, or down.
Procedure
Infants were randomly assigned to the human biological motion prime condition (n = 25), the
schematic motion condition (n = 28), or the randommotion control condition (n = 26). Infants
viewed the video prime on a 61 cm x 36 cm screen placed at eye level, approximately 100 cm
from the infant. Infants’ gaze was filmed and displayed on a computer monitor. Looking times
were coded live using Habit 2000 software [35]. At the beginning of each trial, an attention get-
ter (e.g., moving shape with sound) was used to orient infants’ gaze to the screen. This same
stimulus also appeared when the infant looked away for more than two seconds. Each trial was
15 seconds in duration and infants were given a maximum of 14 trials to habituate. Infants
were considered habituated once they reached the criterion, defined as three successive trials
where the infants’ looking time was less than half of their looking time on the first three trials
[36].
Sequential Touching Task. The sequential touching task is an implicit measure of infants’
ability to differentiate categories by measuring infants’ sequence of touches toward an array of
toys from contrasting categories. Categorization is typically inferred if the infant touches objects
from the same category in sequence before touching objects from the other category [37]. This
procedure is considered appropriate for children between the ages of 13 and 30 months [38]. In-
fants were given a tray of eight toys containing four exemplars from two contrasting categories.
The experimenter instructed infants by saying, “Look at all these toys. These toys are for you!”
as a sweeping motion was made over the toys. Infants were given the opportunity to explore the
toys without constraint for two minutes [39]. If infants dropped a toy on the ground, the experi-
menter simply placed the toy back on the tray.
Two sequential touching trials were administered in counterbalanced order: animal-vehicle
and furniture-vehicle. The animal-vehicle tray was comprised of four animals (pig, lion, duck,
dolphin) and four vehicles (boat, tractor, car, truck). The furniture-vehicle tray was comprised
of four pieces of furniture (grandfather clock, desk, chair, TV stand) and four vehicles (train,
sports car, bus, plane). During the testing session, participants were placed in a high chair and
their parent sat behind them. Parents were advised to not direct their child’s attention to any
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toys (e.g., pointing or labeling). After the participants viewed the priming videos, the sequential
touching task was administered.
Coding and Reliability. The sequences of touches to objects on both trays were coded for
each participant. Thus, infants received separate scores for the animal-vehicle and furniture-ve-
hicle trays. A touch was considered only if the infant coordinated touching using his/her hand,
finger, or another object with eye gaze toward the object. Therefore, the following behaviors
were not counted as a touch: if the infant accidentally touched an object without coordinated
gaze or if the infant touched an object immediately after it was placed back on the tray (if
dropped). Furthermore, to ensure that the infant was actively associating the objects touched
in sequence, a delay between touches of 10 seconds or more was coded as a break in the run. Si-
multaneous touching of two objects from the same category was considered a single touch,
while simultaneous touches of objects from different categories did not constitute a touch. Ad-
ditionally, infants had to touch at minimum of one toy from each category, and throw fewer
than three toys per categorization tray in order to be included.
A mean run length (MRL) for each tray of objects was calculated by dividing the total num-
ber of touches across categories by the total number of runs (i.e. touches to objects of the same
category). The MRL for both trays was compared against chance (1.75). Chance is calculated
using a formula that takes into account the total number of categories (2) and objects used (n)
in the procedure [37]. A MRL of 1.75 or lower indicates that the infant touched the objects in a
random order or in alternation; however, a MRL statistically above 1.75 is interpreted to indi-
cate that infants performed successive touching. It has been argued that successive touching
(above chance) reflects infants’ processing of within-category similarity. In contrast, alternating
touching (below chance) reflects attention to between-category differences. Successive touch-
ing is considered a more advanced form of categorization that emerges later in infancy [40].
Since we predicted that priming would facilitate a mature form of categorization consisting of
above chance performance (i.e. statistically greater than 1.75), one-tailed t-tests were used. An
independent observer blind to the priming condition coded 25% of the sample to assess inter-
rater reliability. A Pearson correlation was computed as r = 0.93 for the human biological mo-
tion condition, r =.88 for the schematic motion condition, and r =.93 for the random motion
condition.
Although MRL analyses are informative to assess the categorical abilities of groups of indi-
viduals, this type of analysis tells us little about an individual child’s knowledge of categories,
nor of the type of touching that took place. Therefore, an additional approach for analyzing
children’s sequential touching was employed. This was to ascertain whether a child’s touches
were primarily aimed toward either category or equally toward both categories. As outlined by
Dixon, Price, Watkins, and Brink [41], children’s sequential touching was coded for “special”
runs, which consist of touching a minimum of three different objects from the same category
(either animal or vehicle) in succession. Based on these ‘special runs’, each participant was then
classified as a noncategorizer, a single categorizer, or an exhaustive (dual) categorizer. Noncate-
gorizers refer to those participants with no special runs in either category. Single categorizers
refer to those participants with at least one special run in only one category (animal or vehicle).
Finally, exhaustive categorizers refer to participants with at least one special run in both catego-
ries (animal and vehicle). The entire sequence of touches for each participant that contains the
special runs was then entered into a Monte Carlo program (TouchStat 3.0) [41] to determine if
they were likely to have occurred by chance. The program then simulated 10,000 random
touch sequences in order to determine the frequency of occurrence of these special runs. Based
on Mandler et al. [37], a probability lower than.10 (p<.10) signified that the participant’s run
was unlikely to be due to chance alone. Based on the probability results, we determined wheth-
er each participant still qualified for their single categorizer or exhaustive categorizer status.
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The percentage of participants in each category was then calculated using the results of the
Monte Carlo analyses.
Results
The infants assigned to the three conditions did not differ in terms of demographic characteris-
tics such as age or sex (age: F(2, 76) = 1.39, p = .26, partial η2 = .04; sex: χ2(2) = .98, p = .61,
f = .11). Skew and kurtosis values were examined for all dependent variables to ensure that the
data were normally distributed. According to Kline [42], a skew of less than 3 and a kurtosis of
less than 10 are acceptable, and thus the present data did not violate the assumption of normal-
ity. To test whether infants habituated to the priming videos, mean looking times during the
first and last three trials of the habituation phase were compared. These two scores were en-
tered into a 2 x 3 (Trial Block X Condition) mixed-design ANOVA. The analysis only revealed
a significant main effect of Trial Block, F(1,76) = 374.66, p<.001, partial η2 = .83, wherein in-
fants looked longer during the first block of trials (M = 9.22, SD = 2.63) than during the second
block (M = 4.31, SD = 1.80). Thus, infants habituated to the video primes in all three
conditions.
To investigate whether priming infants with biological motion had an effect on categoriza-
tion, a 2 (Category [animal-vehicle, furniture-vehicle]) x 3 (Condition [human biological mo-
tion, schematic motion, randommotion]) mixed-design ANOVA was computed on mean run
lengths. No main effect but a statistically significant Category x Condition interaction was
found, F(2, 76) = 4.31, p = .02, partial η2 = .10. Pairwise comparisons (with Bonferroni correc-
tions) revealed significant differences between categorization trials (animal-vehicle vs. furni-
ture-vehicle) for the human biological motion condition,M difference =.39, p = .01. In
contrast, mean differences in MRLs were not significant in the schematic motion condition
(M difference = .09, p = .56) or in the random motion condition (M difference = -.25, p = .11).
When comparing groups on categorization of furniture and vehicles, infants in the human bio-
logical motion condition (M = 1.63, SD = .49) had a MRL equivalent to infants in the schematic
motion condition (M = 1.60, SD = .47;M difference = .035, p = 1.00) and in the randommotion
condition (M = 1.82, SD = 1.01;M difference = -.19, p = 1.00). In contrast, infants primed with
human biological motion had a higher mean MRL for the animal-vehicle categorization
(M = 2.02, SD = .75) than infants primed with the schematic motion (M = 1.68, SD = .48;M dif-
ference = .39, p = .09) and the randommotion (M = 1.57, SD = .35;M difference = .45, p = .01)
(see Fig. 1).
To compare the MRL of each category and condition to chance (MRL = 1.75) a one-sample t-
test was used. Infants in the human biological motion condition performed above chance when
categorizing animals and vehicles, t(24) = 1.87, p =.04, but not when categorizing furniture and
vehicles, t(24) = -1.25, p =.22. The proportion of runs (23%) that included the dolphin was in
line with the expected proportion based on four animals (25%). This indicates that biological
motion primed the concept of animals, and not simply a body part such as legs. Infants in the
schematic motion condition performed at chance when categorizing animals and vehicles,
t(27) =-.73, p =.22, but below chance when categorizing furniture and vehicles, t(27) = -1.71,
p =.05. Infants in the randommotion condition performed below chance when categorizing ani-
mals and vehicles, t(25) = -2.54, p =.01, while the MRL for the furniture-vehicle trial did not dif-
fer from chance, t(25) =.42, p =.34.
Monte Carlo analyses. Children were each classified as categorizers or noncategorizers for
each contrast in each condition using Monte Carlo simulation [43]. Table 1 shows the percent-
ages of children in each condition classified as categorizers, collapsing across single and dual
categorizers for the animal and vehicle contrasts as well as the furniture and vehicle contrasts.
Biological Motion Primes Categorization
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In terms of category pairs, about one-half of children categorized the animals vs. vehicles after
being primed with the human point-light walker (48%). In contrast, much fewer children cate-
gorized animals vs. vehicles following exposure to schematic motion (28%) or randommotion
(11%). As expected, categorization of artifacts was not facilitated by human point-light biologi-
cal motion (28%), schematic biological motion (27%), or random motion (14%) priming.
Discussion
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate if exposure to biological motion primes in-
fants’ categorization of animals and vehicles using a sequential touching task. The results pro-
vide support for the hypothesis that a human biological motion point-light display primes
infants’ ability to categorize animals and vehicles. Further, this effect was not observed when
infants were primed with schematic biological motion, or random motion. Importantly, the
priming effect was specific to the animal-vehicle categorization task and did not influence in-
fants’ performance on the task requiring infants to differentiate two inanimate categories (e.g.,
furniture and vehicles). Additional support for our hypothesis is demonstrated by the fact that
infants in the human biological motion condition categorized above chance (MRL> 1.75) on
the animal-vehicle task, but not on the furniture-vehicle task. None of the mean run lengths in
the other two conditions was above chance. This is an extraordinary finding for two reasons:
1) in a point-light display, the movement of the body is reduced to the motion of dots that rep-
resent the key joints, and 2) the movement of a human body facilitated the categorization of
animals, including mammals and birds. These results can be interpreted as support for a
Figure 1. Mean Run Length as a Function of Priming Condition and Category. The Mean Run Length
(MRL) was calculated for the Human Biological Motion, the RandomMotion, and the Schematic Motion
conditions across categorization of animal-vehicles and furniture-vehicles. A MRL of 1.75 refers to
categorizing at chance level. In the present study, the human biological motion point-light display primed
infants’ ability to categorize animals and vehicles, but not inanimate categories (e.g., furniture and vehicles).
This priming effect was not found in the two other conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0116910.g001
Table 1. Mean percentage of categorizers across condition and type of category.
Priming Condition
Category trial Human Biological Motion Random Motion Schematic Motion
Animal-vehicle 48% 11.5% 28.6%
Furniture-vehicle 28% 26.90% 14.3%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0116910.t001
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precocious association of biological motion with animacy by 12 months of age, as long as the
structure of the human body is implicit in the point-light display.
In contrast to previous research on categorization of animals vs. artifacts without priming,
12-month-old infants performed at a level above chance when tested with a sequential touch-
ing task [1]. The current results also demonstrated that biological motion alone is not sufficient
to improve infants’ animal–vehicle categorization abilities. Infants in the schematic biological
motion condition (‘Michotte’ stimulus) did not perform significantly better on the sequential
touching task than those exposed to random motion. However, the schematic motion differed
from the biological motion prime in many ways, including the absence of human locomotion.
Future studies contrasting intact biological motion with other motion stimuli (e,g., scrambled
motion) will be needed in order to clarify whether animate motion needs to contain form cues
to prime the concept of animacy in a categorization task. Nonetheless, this finding contrasts
with recent research showing that infants as young as 6 months of age attribute goals to sche-
matic animal motion, like the moving square that we used [28], and that schematic biological
motion cues might signal agency before animacy. However, associating goal-directedness to
schematic biological motion does not entail, as the authors suggest, that the moving shape is
perceived as animate. Similarly, goal attribution has been linked to a self-propelled box in 5-
month-olds [44]. These findings do not provide information about whether infants perceive
these objects as animate, only that they are able to associate motion cues considered to be con-
ceptual primitives for the development of the animacy concept [14]. Furthermore, the absence
of a priming effect for the schematic motion condition suggests that this type of motion is not
identified as animal-like by infants, as it is by preschoolers and adults [29].
The research presented here contributes to understanding early conceptual development in
many ways. First, because infants were primed with human biological motion and were tested
on their ability to differentiate non-human animals (mammals and fish) from vehicles, these re-
sults provide evidence for the notion that infants as young as 12 months of age possess an im-
plicit concept of animates, which includes both humans and animals. To date, only a handful of
studies have addressed this issue. Poulin-Dubois, Frenkiel-Fishman, Nayer, and Johnson [45]
reported that infants as young as 16 months of age extend motion and sensory properties mod-
eled on people to animal exemplars (i.e., within the animate category). More recently, Rostad
et al. [4] reported that even 14-month-olds can group animals and people together with a se-
quential touching procedure. We provide evidence that realistic point-light biological motion is
recognized as animate by infants as young as 12 months. To date, research using point-light dis-
plays with infants have reported sensitivity to biological motion and recognition of the solidity
of the human body [46]. Our data suggest that such displays also activate stored knowledge
about animate beings broadly defined.
The second main contribution of the present study is to identify biological motion as an ani-
macy cue that could assist infants in categorizing animals as different from vehicles. In addition
to salient perceptual features (such as faces) that help infants identify some entities as an ani-
mal, it has been proposed that the animacy concept is derived from salient spatial information,
especially movement in space [13]. Animals are self-propelled entities that interact with other
objects from a distance, whereas inanimates do not move unless they are contacted by some-
thing else and they do not interact with other objects from a distance. Some research has inves-
tigated whether infants expect animals to move according to animate motion properties. For
example, self-propelled motion has been found to be associated with human hands and animals
by 7 months of age [47–50]. Infants expect an inert inanimate object to move only when con-
tacted by another moving entity; however, these expectations are suspended for a person or
other agent capable of self-generated motion [51–56]. To date, no research has examined if
manner of motion (mechanical vs. biological) is also associated with the global categories of
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animals and vehicles. The findings of the present study support the hypothesis that biological
motion is an important building block in the acquisition of the concept of animacy. Since even
newborns preferentially attend to biological motion, it is likely the case that this ability facili-
tates categorization and not the reverse as some form of global categorization has been docu-
mented only a few months later with the familiarization-novelty procedure. Unlike self-
propulsion, which appears to apply equally to animals and vehicles without knowledge about
human agency in vehicle motion, biological motion might be uniquely associated with animacy
from birth.
The priming paradigm developed here to assess whether infants associate biological motion
with animals offers new ways to study the foundations for the development of early categoriza-
tion. First, it could be easily adapted to test younger infants by pairing it with categorization
tasks appropriate for infants younger than 12 months, such as the object examination proce-
dure. Second, rigid, mechanical motion could be substituted for biological motion as the prim-
ing stimulus in order to determine if inanimates are associated with this manner of motion.
One would expect that categorization of vehicles would be facilitated by exposure to, for exam-
ple, a car rolling. Future research may also investigate whether priming with schematic biologi-
cal motion will boost older infants’ concept of animacy. Although infants might show hard-
wired sensitivity to the minimal information that the Michotte [27] caterpillar-like motion pat-
tern provides, learning that this two-anchor crawling might have commonalities with 4-legged
animals’ motion might require additional experience. Biological motion perception is remark-
ably robust and has immense evolutionary and social importance [19, 57]. The detection of bi-
ological motion is a fundamental perceptual process that is part of an early developing and
evolutionarily-endowed mechanism shared across species. This ability to recognize and prefer-
entially attend to the motion of biological entities, even when presented in its most rudimenta-
ry form, has been hypothesized to underlie developing social cognition (e.g., [24, 58]. Further
studies should aim at expanding our knowledge of its role in the emergence and development
of infants’ animate/inanimate distinction.
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